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Mohammed Reza Shah’s rule of Iran from 1942 until 1979 spanned eight U.S. 
presidents. His desire for military supremacy over his neighbors and his distrust of the 
Soviets led him to seek a military relationship with the United States following the end of 
the Second World War. As the U.S.-Iranian relationship developed, the idea of arming 
Iran came to form a key component of U.S. policy due to waning U.S. options in the Gulf 
through the 1960s and an alignment in U.S. and Iranian regional policies in the early 
1970s. This relationship eventually resulted in Iran wielding a military that was, on paper, 
within reach of becoming the world’s fifth-most-advanced force in 1978. 
By the time of Richard Nixon’s arrival in office in January 1969, Iran was already 
America’s single-largest arms purchaser. Whilst this is notable in and of itself, it is vastly 
overshadowed by what followed. By late 1972 Nixon leveraged U.S. Middle Eastern 
regional policy primarily around the focal point of a militarily strong, pro-American Iran. 
Concurrently, the Shah was encouraged, and empowered, to begin an unprecedented 
and virtually unmoderated military spending spree in what is now known as the “blank 
check.” 
Nixon did this for two reasons. Firstly, the British decided to withdraw their military 
forces from the Gulf, leaving behind a vacuum of sorts. Secondly, the Vietnam quagmire 
stressed the limits of the direct application of U.S. power in peripheral areas. Iran seemed 
the obvious candidate to turn to. There was a legacy of U.S. investment going back to the 
1953 coup that the CIA engineered with the British to restore the Shah’s autocracy after 
a left-leaning nationalist government had marginalised him. Other possible pro-U.S. 
candidates were eliminated from consideration: Saudi Arabia had languished in military 
redundancy beset by political instability, and moving any closer to Israel would risk 
pushing the Arab states further toward the Soviets. 
Within the space of a few short months in 1972, the Shah purchased over $3 billion 
dollars of arms from the United States—a twentyfold increase on the prior year. For the 
remainder of the 1970s, the Shah continued to buy arms in the multibillions per annum, 
dwarfing all other U.S. allies such as Israel and the NATO nations. In the Shah, 
Washington had an ally who was willing to accept a position as a regional policeman and 
rich enough to afford to do so (due to his ever-rising oil income). In return, Iran secured a 
high-level alliance with its preferred side in the Cold War, a buffer against potential 
Soviet incursions from its northern border. It was a win-win scenario for both nations. 
Yet the “pros” in the arrangement overshadowed a series of significant “cons.” 
The wisdom of choosing Iran as the primary vehicle for outsourcing containment in the 
Gulf was controversial in its very essence. Firstly, Iran was not an Arab nation like the 
majority of its neighbors. Secondly, the Iranian religious population was comprised of 
Shia Muslims rather than the regionally dominant Sunnis. Thirdly, under the Shah’s rule, 
Iran was widely perceived as an arrogant and status-quo-threatening regime by its 
neighbors. In sum, the Shah’s Iran was neither respected nor liked in the region. 
Therefore, investing in promoting Iranian hegemony as a proxy for American power was 
at odds with the reality in the wider region. Additionally, the disproportionate extent of 
the military investment in the Shah’s regime is partially responsible for the tide of anti-
American sentiment that endures in Iran to this day. If the Shah had not been 
overthrown by the Iranians themselves in 1979, it is likely that wider regional opposition 
would have manifested to the Shah’s ambitions as his plans became ever grander. For 
those reasons, Nixon’s blank check and the policy package that surrounded it was an 
extremely risky bet. 
When Nixon was forced to resign to avoid impeachment over the Watergate affair, the 
successor Gerald R. Ford administration found itself the steward for an Iran-arms policy 
that was under threat from within the administration and from Congress. Executive 
power had peaked in the Nixon years in what has been widely referred to as a period of 
imperial presidency. Yet by 1974 Congress had begun to recover lost ground. Congress 
continually battled with Ford for influence over military sales, with Iran at the forefront of 
concerns due to its extraordinarily large volume of purchases. The truth was, Congress 
was in the dark. It, and the public by extension, had no idea what was going on with 
U.S.-Iranian relations. Nixon had kept the arrangement secret. The majority of the mid-
1970s was spent with Congress attempting to secure access and understanding over why 
the United States was arming Iran to such an extent—which the administration skillfully 
navigated in such a way as to stall and restrict progress. 
Ford’s first secretary of defense, Jim Schlesinger, led a small cabal in the administration 
advising that the relationship with Iran was unwise. Schlesinger’s concern, which had 
traction in the Pentagon and in other departments such as USAID and the Treasury, was 
that Iran could not absorb the arms it was buying due to its primitive level of 
development. Reports that Iran had to regularly import such low-level personnel as truck 
drivers due to a lack of skills in its domestic workforce did not inspire confidence that it 
could operate its eighty F-14s and other advanced U.S. equipment. In that sense, the 
arms being sold required the presence of many thousands of U.S. support staff, who 
risked becoming a proxy U.S. military force deployed at the service of a foreign 
government—or a liability in the case of a security breakdown in Iran. Concurrently, the 
vast military budget of the Shah was stunting Iranian economic progress and could lead 
to unforeseen social problems. Schlesinger was sacked by Ford and replaced with Donald 
Rumsfeld, who together with Henry Kissinger ensured that any trends in Washington to 
upset the path of U.S.-Iranian arms policy were muted. 
While Schlesinger’s concerns were legitimate, the security relationship was too important 
to suffer second guessing in the short term. Ultimately, Ford’s full approval for the 
military and strategic relationship that Nixon initiated with Iran ensured that the events 
of the early 1970s became the norm, rather than an irregularity. It was the act that sealed 
the fate of the United States in its relationship with the Shah. 
Jimmy Carter triumphed in the Presidential election of 1976, partially on a popular 
platform of increased arms control and the introduction of human-rights considerations 
into U.S. foreign policy. Despite the Shah’s authoritarian nature and Iran being a prime 
example of an extreme arms policy, the post–1972 relationship with Iran largely endured. 
In 1977, Carter actually sold more arms to Iran than the United States had during any 
year prior. 
Carter did introduce some nuance into the relationship by ending the blank-check culture 
that had characterized the Nixon/Ford years. Instead of approving all arms requests by 
default, he sought to moderate the Shah’s ambitions. In reality this had little effect on the 
overall relationship due to the Shah’s power of persuasion and the leverage he wielded as 
a pivotal ally in a sensitive region. The Shah continued to prepare arms-sale requests in 
the multibillions as late as mid-1978, safe in the knowledge that he had the backing of the 
new president, who had toasted the Shah as “a rock of stability” during a visit to Tehran 
over the New Year period of 1977-1978. 
By maintaining the arms relationship with the Shah, Carter’s experience exemplifies the 
lack of alternatives that existed for U.S. regional policy by the late 1970s. After thirty 
years of investment and political winnowing, America’s regional options had become 
heavily leveraged on the Shah’s Iran. A path dependency had taken hold that even an 
antiarms president was powerless to materially alter. It had been no surprise that Ford 
continued to arm Iran. But witnessing the same advocacy from Carter is testament to the 
power and influence that Washington had outsourced to the Shah. The project was 
simply, in today’s jargon, too big to fail. 
Unfortunately for U.S. policy makers, the Iranian people had other intentions in mind. 
Their removal of the Shah and his regime through the winter of 1978-1979 tore Iran 
from the United States, and a deeply hostile regime took power in Tehran. The largest 
deployment of U.S. arms in one single country fell into the hands of angry mobs shouting 
“death to America and Israel.” 
Adding this layer of analysis into U.S.-Iranian relations is not just historical. It provides 
insight into the major U.S. Cold War policy shifts that followed the Iranian Revolution—
such as the Carter Doctrine and Reagan’s decision to go on the offensive against the 
Soviet Union. Put simply, those policies bore a direct relation to the failure of outsourcing 
containment in the Middle East via arms sales and security relationships with allies such 
as the Shah. In that sense, arming Iran was the grand test of Nixon’s idea of outsourcing 
containment. And it became its grand failure. When Iran descended into revolution, the 
very essence of U.S. policy towards the entire Gulf region imploded. The consequence 
was the direct application of U.S. power in the region—something that had been resisted 
for decades due to fears of overstretch and a reluctance to extend the definition of U.S. 
national interests to another theater. 
Looking at the Middle East today, it seems that the loss of Iran was a game-changing 
event. It forced the United States to cross a line into territory which it has been unable to 
step back from due to the ongoing geopolitical centrality of the region. 
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